This periodic report assesses the contours of the emerging alliance of the United States’ four primary adversaries: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK). Based on open-source research, this ‘CRINK Alliance Project’ offers analysis of how this axis is disrupting or reshaping the Operational Environment. Its purpose is to help military leaders and policymakers discern whether, how, and when these countries’ interests align and diverge; anticipate potential friction points; and seize opportunities to counter their joint efforts to threaten the United States and its interests.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Russia has deployed a wide array of AI-enabled systems in its war against Ukraine, including loitering munitions; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms; automated targeting tools; and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.
Russia has benefitted from other U.S. adversaries in its use of AI-enabled weapons, particularly Chinese dual-use technologies and components for AI-enabled weapon systems, as well as Iranian AI-enhanced drones.
China, Iran, and North Korea are learning from Russia’s and Ukraine’s use of AI-enabled weapons by carefully observing and incorporating lessons from battlefield experimentation with AI, particularly with regard to drone swarms and ISR integration.

In general, U.S. adversaries are strengthening bilateral ties on AI-enabled weapons, such as partnerships between Chinese manufacturers and Iranian drone units employing AI.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

CRINK collaboration around AI, though still in its early phase, could pose significant challenges for the U.S. Army, based on lessons learned from its application in the Ukraine war. These developments have major implications for U.S. Army planning around force posture, battlefield adaptation, and acquisition, given the speed of AI-driven innovation in warfare.

AI-enabled UAVs are cheap, scalable, and effective at the operational level on future battlefields. Russia’s AI-enabled UAV use, supported by Chinese components and Iranian designs, signals a shift toward mass, attritable, AI-assisted drone employment that challenges traditional U.S. Army air defense and force protection models. Ukrainian startups have also demonstrated the scalability and diffusion of AI.

CRINK collaboration is likely to accelerate adaptation. Combat experimentation by Russia, combined with Chinese industrial support and Iranian drone expertise, is shortening devel¬opment timelines and enabling rapid diffusion of AI-enabled tactics across theaters, even if there are divergent time horizons and approaches to AI among CRINK states. This could mean the U.S. Army may face more mature and effective AI-enabled weapon systems and combined weapon systems from multiple adversaries. This also creates an opportunity for the United States to exploit these dependencies by interrupting supply chains.

Any battlefield advantages around AI will be fleeting. The Ukraine war shows that AI advantages are often temporary, as adversaries rapidly observe, copy, and iterate on software, sensors, and countermeasures. AI will likely accelerate the pace at which military learning occurs during wartime, challenging the Army to operate at increased battlefield speed and adopt new processes that accelerate research, development, and fielding of new technology and TTPs.