In a potential large-scale combat operation (LSCO) between the United States and China, a U.S. Army brigade combat team (BCT) would face a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army heavy combined arms brigade (HCAB) that is determined, aggressive, and capable of fighting in all domains. The PLA would task-organize its forces using a layered, multidomain approach aimed at disrupting and paralyzing the adversary’s operational system. The HCAB would receive direct and indirect combat support from across the PLA joint force, including space; cyber; electronic warfare (EW); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and fires.

A U.S. Army BCT defending against an attacking PLA Army HCAB would contend with a phased operation designed to isolate the BCT from the division, paralyze BCT command-and-control and fires systems, and ultimately cause the BCT to culminate before the HCAB commits its main forces. This would include shaping operations to gain information dominance through reconnaissance, fires, and EW, massed fires and effects supporting the HCAB’s main effort, and aggressive maneuver and the employment of brief, violent volleys of both kinetic and nonkinetic fires on the objective.

A U.S. Army BCT attacking a PLA Army HCAB would encounter an active, elastic, and deep system designed to lure, attrit, and ambush an attacking force before destroying it with a decisive counterstrike. This would include shaping operations focused on delaying, channeling, and attriting the BCT; spoiling attacks and counterreconnaissance; extensive use of denial and deception to disrupt and delay the BCT; and aggressive counterattacks to exploit opportunities or seal points of penetration.

Operating against an HCAB in LSCO would challenge the BCT’s intelligence, fires, and protection warfighting functions due to the PLA’s focus on gaining and maintaining information dominance, massed fires, and purpose-built, systems-focused combat effects. The HCAB’s reliance on reconnaissance as part of its information dominance campaign suggests the BCT may need to conduct continuous counterreconnaissance throughout all phases of operations. The HCAB’s massed fires, supported by robust reconnaissance efforts, would enable a focused and dedicated counterbattery effort. The PLA’s approach to systems warfare, manifested at the tactical level as the task organization of theater and group army assets to the HCAB, suggests that BCT protection systems will be challenged by nontraditional fires and effects. Finally, accurately emulating PLA combat equipment in training and at Combat Training Centers with opposing forces (OPFOR) may provide the BCT with more realistic training events and better prepare the BCT to gain and maintain the advantage during LSCO.